Lobbying

Background

In many ways, Canada is a world leader in lobbying regulations. The federal lobbying system in particular is commendable for its ambitious scope. The federal government not only tracks lobbying organizations through a registry but also their communications with (some) public officers. Subnationally, there have been attempts to develop lobbying systems with moderate success. Few countries around the world ask for as such transparency as Canada.

But this rosy picture is somewhat misleading. First, Canada’s more ambitious lobbying systems have only emerged within the last 30 years, if that. Most system reforms *appear* to be driven by scandals. Second, cross-national comparisons may obscure the flaws in our systems. The federal system, for instance, is limited by its ‘significant part of duties’ concept.

This research trajectory has two components. The first component contemplates the factors shaping lobbying system development, particularly within Canada. Conventional lobbying system causal accounts fixate on scandals, but this explanation can only go so far. Despite high profile scandals, the Canadian federal system has significant institutional challenges. Subnational systems with less media concentration also frustrate scandal-driven explanations. In this part of the project, I evaluate what political economy can tell us about lobbying system development.

The second component focuses on what publicly available tells us about lobbying access. To be sure, there are problems with using lobbying communication and registry datasets. Organizations can circumvent lobbying system transparency requirements. Informal lobbying is real and perhaps more influential than formal lobbying. This noted, lobbying registries and communication reports can still offer us insight with a grain of salt. Without an empirical demonstration of the gravity of informal lobbying, we ought not dismiss publicly available datasets. Used appropriately, these datasets can tell us about access trends and potential democratic pitfalls.

Key Empirical Puzzles

How do lobbying systems evolve? What can political economy tell us about this evolution?

What explains lobbying institutional development?

How does regional location affect organizational lobbying access?

Research Design

This research trajectory involves both qualitative and quantitative aspects. In studying lobbying institutions and their development, I primarily employ process-tracing. In studying lobbying access, I analyze large-N datasets. The latter is studied through multivariate regression analysis.

1. Casing

Lobbying systems: by jurisdiction. Observations are drawn over time, scanning for decision points and focussing events. Lobbying access: Organizations x lobbying communications x (usually) month

2. Data Collection

Lobbying systems: annual reports, committee witness testimony, website information, establishing Acts and regulations, Commissioner reports and decisions, and (where relevant) third-party reports. Lobbying access: publicly available datasets on registrations and (if possible) monthly communications, and organizational sectoral and industrial information. The latter is self-collected using Websites and organization descriptions.

3. Data Analysis

Lobbying systems: process-tracing and (sometimes) content analysis. We look for the empirical fingerprints of political economic and opportunistic factors in system development over time. Lobbying access: multivariate regression analysis.